The Last Anti-Revolutionary Christian Peace in Europe: The Holy Alliance Treaty of 1815

In September, [Alexander, the Tsar of Russia] and the monarchs of Austria and Prussia signed the famous treaty forming the Holy Alliance. It bound them, along with the other European sovereigns who would later accede to it, to deal with each other and with their peoples on the basis of the Christian Gospel, so that the European alliance would become a fraternal union between rulers and peoples banishing war and conflict from the earth. It is easy to poke fun at this idea, especially the attempt to embody it in a treaty. It is also possible (though finally unconvincing) to see the Holy Alliance as just another of the Tsar’s attempts to gain and exercise hegemony over Europe and to flatter his ego. This misjudges both his motives and the practical effects which Alexander’s ideals and the Holy Alliance had in Europe. They obviously helped promote another moderate peace treaty for France; it is less obvious but equally true that they helped guard Europe against an active, power-political Russian hegemony.

Those who argue that Alexander was bent on increasing Russian influence and hegemony in Europe ignore how many things he did in 1815 which worked in the other direction. Historically, the pillar of Russia’s Northern System had been a close partnership with Prussia. To save the general alliance, Alexander early in 1815 had helped isolate Prussia and force it to give up its expansionist aims, and thereby almost forced Prussia back into Austria’s arms. Various German states, especially Bavaria and Württemberg, offered themselves to Russia to help block Austria. Russia regularly backed Austria’s claims against Bavaria and ultimately helped force it and Württemberg to join the German Confederation, all for the sake of the general alliance. Historically, Russia had built up its security and its influence in Germany by exploiting intra-German rivalries, especially between Austria and Prussia. Alexander instead promoted peaceful settlements in Germany, and encouraged Austria and Prussia to run Germany as partners. In helping Britain protect France, Alexander strengthened Wellington’s hand and encouraged the French to look to Britain rather than Russia for protection.

The Holy Alliance itself served to restrain Russia. It had this effect partly because Metternich [the Austrian foreign minister], before Austria signed the treaty, altered it so that it called, not for a fraternal union between monarchs and their peoples, but for a paternal alliance of monarchs over their peoples. The main restraint, however, lay in the fact that Alexander really believed in his ideals. Metternich and Castlereagh, realists in politics themselves, recognized this and took advantage of it. Just as Alexander’s language should not be dismissed as mystical nonsense or a cover for Russian ambitions, Metternich should not be seen as simply manipulating him for Austrian purposes. Metternich also, in his way, believed in the Holy Alliance. Both, like many other statesmen and political theorists of the time, were genuinely convinced that politics had to rest on moral principles, which in turn derived from religious truths. They differed not as a sceptic in religion does from an evangelical preacher, but as a rigidly orthodox churchman does from a mystical enthusiast suspected of heresy and proselytizing.

Castlereagh likewise knew better than to dismiss the Holy Alliance as nonsense. He recognized its absurdity as a working treaty and he characterized Baroness Krüdener, who inspired it in Alexander, as ‘an old Fanatick, who has a considerable reputation amongst the few high flyers in Religion that are to be found at Paris’. At the same time he urged Liverpool to persuade the Prince Regent to subscribe to it personally, though without involving the British government. Alexander’s mind, he explained, was not quite stable. Last year he seemed bent on conquest, this year on universal peace and benevolence. ‘It is at all events wise’, he said, ‘to profit by this disposition as far as it will carry us. This is peculiarly the feeling of Austria + Prussia, who hope to keep down, now that they are compatriots, much of the spirit of the frontier jealousy wh.[ich] has hitherto embarrassed them.’ Castlereagh, in short, saw that the Holy Alliance served to restrain both Russia and the German powers. Unlike some historians and political scientists, he did not ignore the role and value of moral principles in international politics.

[From the footnotes]

Britain, after all, was also carrying on an international moral-religious crusade at Vienna in 1815, its campaign to outlaw the slave trade. Like the Holy Alliance, this was an intrinsically good cause involving genuine idealism, which served indirectly to restrain Britain itself. If Britain wished other states to co-operate in wiping out the slave trade, especially Spain, Portugal, and France, it had to exercise restraint in its control of the seas.