Recently Richard Dawkins said on radio that it is "wise and sensible" to abort children with Down Syndrome as that would "increase the amount of happiness in the world". While a seemingly utilitarian sentiment, but this is qualified by the fact that first, Aristotle himself supported such a eugenic policy, and secondly, a friend of mine pointed out that downies are on average happier than most other people, with simple cares and simple wants.
If downies however are happier than most people, then a simple utilitarian calculus would support fostering and raising them. But here we come to a famous objection by, ironically John Stuart Mill when it came to his own utilitarian theory. It is basically the "qualitative happiness" objection. It was objected that if the object of ethics was maximising happiness, why shouldn't we frame society just to maximise the simplest pleasures instead of pursuing the higher, and more difficult, goods which involves lots of suffering in the process? That's where his famous saying concerning the superiority of Socrates dissatisfied than a pig satisfied comes in. Thus Socrates, with his superior development of higher abilities, more robust character, and greater flourishing, even if he was rendered miserable by his philosophical activities, was objectively "better" than a mere pig with lower abilities but easily satisfied with its slop.
But given the Christian ethic of preserving and saving the downy without regard for their ability to flourish or develop a robust or deep character, must surely reject the fundamental premise of Aristotle for "the good life", whereby "good" is defined in terms of human flourishing and development, which clearly is impossible for the downy. The downy is capable of a "good life" because he can still contribute to society and is capable of "happiness" defined in the utilitarian desire-satisfaction manner. Given the Christian egalitarian affirmation of all life qua life without regard for its "quality" or deeper flourishing or character/virtue development in the Aristotelian sense, the Christian ethic must be fundamentally utilitarian, prizing the satisfaction of desires over the development of the self, a satisfaction all persons including the downy is capable of. Some people to be sure have desires for "higher" goals and "higher" goods, but all are equal before God in the sense that we define a good life in the sense of having satisfied one's desires for the riches and goods of God, be they high or low, great or humble. The person who enjoys the "higher goods" of an exquisite mathematical proof or symphony is no more pleasing to God compared to a downy simply enjoying a chocolate ice cream on a warm day.
In the end we once more note the fundamental divergence between the Christian ethic, with its fundamental "pro-life" or vitalist approach of valuing life qua life in the materialistic sense, over the classical ethic whereby a person is to be valued for the "quality" of his life, valuable only in so far as "well-lived", defined in elitist terms, of which the downy is incapable of, and therefore to be exterminated in Aristotle's polity. It is very hard, and I would contend, impossible to reconcile the universal ethic of love of Christianity for all creatures, without regard for their status or even biological abilities, with an ethic which fundamentally prizes human flourishing, the development of the self, the nurture of character, the exercise of virtues, which fundamentally requires abilities which not all are capable of, and therefore valueless in his polity.