So far I've been arguing for variants of moral nihilism and against the Anglo-American superstitious reverence of morality as well as how moralism is basically their religion, in this post I want to qualify my critique of the "morality institution" and argue that it does actually have a proper delimited purpose and utility. But in which case we need to be careful that we are speaking of "morality" in the older sense of mores and customs, social conventions, and not in the later Post-Reformation exalted sense of the standard of right or wrong or the divine law.
As the above Oxford English Definition shows, the older meaning of "morals" is actually just "mores", customs, social conventions and codes of behaviour of particular cultures or societies.
Now, for Christians the true "standard of right and wrong" is clearly the will of God ("Not every one that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven; but he that doeth the will of my Father which is in heaven." Matthew 7:21), the question becomes how do mores/customs/conventions figure on our ability to obey the will of God? It is clear that theologians and philosophers of the 17th-19th century were very much concerned with "morals", but they understood "mores" very differently in terms of its social utility and use in aiding us to do what's right/wrong, it is not itself the standard of right and wrong.
I think this extended discussion from William Paley (yes, THE Paley of watchmaker argument for God fame), who argues for the need
Virtue is “the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness.”
According to which definition, “the good of mankind” is the subject; the “will of God,” the rule; and “everlasting happiness,” the motive, of human virtue.
[...]
I shall proceed to state a few observations, which relate to the general regulation of human conduct; unconnected indeed with each other, but very worthy of attention; and which fall as properly under the title of this chapter as of any future one.
I. Mankind act more from habit than reflection.
It is on few only and great occasions that men deliberate at all; on fewer still, that they institute any thing like a regular inquiry into the moral rectitude or depravity of what they are about to do; or wait for the result of it. We are for the most part determined at once; and by an impulse, which is the effect and energy of pre-established habits. And this constitution seems well adapted to the exigencies of human life, and to the imbecility of our moral principle. In the current occasions and rapid opportunities of life, there is often-times little leisure for reflection; and were there more, a man, who has to reason about his duty, when the temptation to transgress it is upon him, is almost sure to reason himself into an error.
If we are in so great a degree passive under our habits; Where, it is asked, is the exercise of virtue, the guilt of vice, or any use of moral and religious knowledge? I answer, In the forming and contracting of these habits.
And hence results a rule of life of considerable importance, viz. that many things are to be done and abstained from, solely for the sake of habit. We will explain ourselves by an example or two. A beggar, with the appearance of extreme distress, asks our charity. If we come to argue the matter, whether the distress be real, whether it be not brought upon himself, whether it be of public advantage to admit such application, whether it be not to encourage idleness and vagrancy, whether it may not invite impostors to our doors, whether the money can be well spared, or might not be better applied; when these considerations are put together, it may appear very doubtful, whether we ought or ought not to give any thing. But when we reflect, that the misery before our eyes excites our pity, whether we will or not; that it is of the utmost consequence to us to cultivate this tenderness of mind; that it is a quality, cherished by indulgence, and soon stifled by opposition; when this, I say, is considered, a wise man will do that for his own sake, which he would have hesitated to do for the petitioner’s; he will give way to his compassion, rather than offer violence to a habit of so much general use.
A man of confirmed good habits, will act in the same manner without any consideration at all.
This may serve for one instance; another is the following. A man has been brought up from his infancy with a dread of lying. An occasion presents itself where, at the expense of a little veracity, he may divert his company, set off his own wit with advantage, attract the notice and engage the partiality of all about him. This is not a small temptation. And when he looks at the other side of the question, he sees no mischief that can ensue from this liberty, no slander of any man’s reputation, no prejudice likely to arise to any man’s interest. Where there nothing further to be considered, it would be difficult to show why a man under such circumstances might not indulge his humour. But when he reflects that his scruples about lying have hitherto preserved him free from this vice; that occasions like the present will return, where the inducement may be equally strong, but the indulgence much less innocent; that his scruples will wear away by a few transgressions, and leave him subject to one of the meanest and most pernicious of all bad habits—a habit of lying, whenever it will serve his turn: when all this, I say, is considered, a wise man will forego the present, or a much greater pleasure, rather than lay the foundation of a character so vicious and contemptible.
From what has been said, may be explained also the nature of habitual virtue. By the definition of virtue, placed at the beginning of this chapter, it appears, that the good of mankind is the subject, the will of God the rule, and everlasting happiness the motive and end, of all virtue. Yet, in fact, a man shall perform many an act of virtue, without having either the good of mankind, the will of God, or everlasting happiness in his thought. How is this to be understood? In the same manner as that a man may be a very good servant, without being conscious, at every turn, of a particular regard to his master’s will, or of an express attention to his master’s interest: indeed, your best old servants are of this sort: but then he must have served for a length of time under the actual direction of these motives, to bring it to this: in which service, his merit and virtue consist.
There are habits, not only of drinking, swearing, and lying, and of some other things, which are commonly acknowledged to be habits, and called so; but of every modification of action, speech, and thought. Man is a bundle of habits.
-The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy: Book 1, Chapter 7: Virtue
Thus we have here an excellent argument for the formation and adherence to habits, mores and customs. Generally attempting to discern and reflect on the reasons for action in every case takes up too much mental bandwidth, and opens one to the temptation of rationalising away the right course of action in particular difficult cases. Thus, ingrained customary and habitual adherence to established mores will, overall, improve the propensity of society to do the right thing.
But notice that these are rather prudential and pragmatic arguments for moral formation and adhering to mores, they are not exalted theological or philosophical arguments. It still remains to teachers and civil authorities to ensure that the correct mores and customs are formed. Thus, mores and customs are not themselves the ultimate standard, they are social codes/rules formed to achieve the true standard: the will of God, but their use is instrumentalist, pragmatic, for social and personal utility.
If mores and customs were to mean no more than this very practical sense, then it is a thing very much to be welcome. But this will also mean that mores/customs/morals will always be open to revision and reformation to be more perfectly conformed to the will of God, and they are not themselves the ultimate standard.
To end on a historical note, doubtless English philosophers and theologians were concerned about "morals and mores" after the religious upheavals of the 16th-17th century where theological questions and practices were constantly being litigated, overhauled, and revised. After the dust settled with the Glorious Revolution, it is likely that they sought to stabilise religious life by instilling stable "mores and customs" for civic and religious life in England. The unfortunate thing is that England was stable for so long that the religious origins of those "mores and customs" was forgotten, and "morality" became a strange autonomous institution in itself, the standard of right and wrong which floats in the air. I think given our tumultuous times, it is time to interrogate and revisit our current "mores and customs" and ask what are its exact characteristics, origins and influences, and reform them accordingly.